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Tel.: (1-202) 473.4062, Email: SJorgensen@Worldbank.orgThe revolutionary  idea that defines  the boundary  between  modern  times and the past  is the mastery  of
risk: the notion that the future  is more  than a whim of gods  and  that men and women  are not passive
before  nature.
Peter  L. Bernstein  (1996): Against  the Gods - The remarkable  story  of risk.
1.  Background
The  Social Protection Family  of the  World Bank is  scheduled to develop  its  Sector
Strategy Paper (SSP) by the fall of  1999.  This is an opportunity for the sector to take
stock of its accomplishments and to develop the strategic thrust of the Bank's future work
in this  area.  This note serves as a conceptual background piece for this  work, and is
currently  being used as  background for the development of regional social protection
(SP) strategy papers.
SP is a young, but very dynamic  portfolio of the World Bank.  While elements of SP
have always been present in Bank activities, recent economic developments have brought
the need for appropriate social safety nets, labor market programs, and retirement income
schemes into sharper focus.  These include the restructuring of Eastern Europe begun in
the early 90s, the enhanced emphasis on poverty reduction in the recent years, and the
current financial crisis in East Asia.  As a result, Bank lending in the social protection
area has increased nearly six-fold since 1992 with a lending volume of $ 3015 billion in
FY98, arnounting to over 13 percent of total Bank lending.  An important shift has been
towards the increasing use of policy-based lending (e.g., Russia, Kazakhstan, Korea, and
Brazil).
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2The lending and non-lending activities by the World Bank in the SP area cover a wide
range of activities, including:
*  crisis support for the poor;
*  development ofjob  placement offices and retraining programs;
*  the technical and financial support of pension reform in many countries; and
*  conceptual work on labor standards, child labor, and disability.
While all of these activities fall clearly within the domain of SP, a convincing conceptual
framework which links those programs together credibly is only slowing emerging.  Yet
such a conceptual framework is required if past activities are to be appropriately assessed
and compared, current activities improved upon, and new activities better designed. The
development and presentation of such a conceptual framework is the purpose of this note.
This exercise is an ongoing process in which each draft reflects feedback from the World
Bank's  regional,  policy  and  research  departments, and feedback  from  clients, inter-
national partners and academic institutions.  Feedback and comments should be sent to
either of the authors.
To  develop the  conceptual  underpinnings, the  objectives and  instruments of  SP  are
viewed under the rubric of  Social Risk Management (SRM).  SRM consists of public
measures  intended  to  assist  individuals, households  and  communities  in  managing
income  risks in  order  to  reduce  vulnerability, improve consumption smoothing, and
enhance equity while contributing to economic development in a participatory manner.
To support the approach and its logic, the structure of this note is as follows: Chapter 2
sets the stage and presents global trends, definitions and outlook.  Chapter 3 presents key
issues of SRM, from the reasons for World Bank concern to a typology of strategies and
instruments and  ends  with  the  role  of the  main  actors.  Chapter 4  focuses  on  the
boundaries of SP/SRM and on three key policy issues to balance equity, efficiency and
political sustainability.  Chapter 5 ends with preliminary list of ways in which the new
framework  may  effect  our  view  of  SP  and  the  development  of  new  and  better
instruments.
11.  Setting  the stage:  global  trends,  definitions  and outlook
A.  Global trends and increases in risk
Recent trends in the evolution of trade, technology, and political systems have created
great opportunities for improvements in welfare around the world. Globalization of trade
in goods, services, and factors of production has the world community poised to reap the
fruits of global comparative advantages.  Technology is helpmig  to speed innovation and
holds the potential to  remove the major constraints to  development for many people.
Political systems are increasingly open, setting the stage for improved governance by
holding those in power accountable to larger segments of the population.  Combined,
3these  trends  create  a  unique
opportunity for unprecedented social  Issuesfor  Poverty Reduction
and economic development.  "The  key issue  for the early part of the next century is
how to bridge [the] gap between opportunity and risk.
The other side of the coin, however,  The challengeforpolicy  makers is the design and
implementation of institutions, mechanisms and policies
at various  levels  to harness  the potentialfor  poverty
that  increase the  opportunity  for  reduction, by setting a long term course which will
welfare improvements also  increase  access global and local opportunity but allow broad
the  variability  of  the  outcome  for  sharing of the gains  from development, while managing
society as a whole and even more so  the short term risks of inequality, vulnerability,
for  specific groups.  This  was  marginalization and social dissolution. This is not an
easy task, and crucially important will be learningfrom
demonstrated on a worldwide scale in  a detailed evaluation of experiences with actual
1998 with the global financial crisis.  interventions in the past. It is important to go beyond
There is no certainty that  any such  broad strategies, to draw lessonsfor  implementation
improvements will be widely shared  which take into account time horizons and social
across  individuals,  households,  ethnic  constraints that  policy makers actually  face. "
groups, communities, and  countries.  Source: Ravi Kanbur, Staff Director of World
Increased trade or better  technology  Development Report 2000 on Poverty (1998).
can increase the differences between
the "have" and "have-nots" just as it can increase the opportunity for all, depending on
the  social  context  into  which  it  is  introduced  and  the  policy  measures  taken.
Globalization-induced increases in income variability combined with marginalization and
social exclusion can, in fact, increase the vulnerability of major groups in the population.
In other words, the risks are as large as the potential rewards.  To further complicate
matters, the trend towards globalization and the higher mobility of production factors also
reduce the ability of Governments to raise revenues and pursue  independent economic
policies and, thus, to have national policies when they are needed most.  This three-part
challenge is the background for a strategy of Social Protection.  This strategy paper will
outline  what  governments can  and  should  do  to  help  individuals,  households,  and
communities to better manage income risk and, most importantly, what the World Bank
can and should do to support these efforts.
B. What  is Social  Protection  and what  should it do?
Social Protection (SP) consists of public interventions to assist individuals, households
and communities in better managing income 1 risks. The objectives of these interventions
are  a  subset  of  the  overall  development  objectives  of  economically  sustainable
participatorv development with poverty reduction.  Specifically, SP seeks to:
1 Ultimately the goal for individuals and households is to optimize welfare through appropriate consum-
ption choice, including availability of basic goods and services. As a policy variable we are concerned with
income, its  level and  variance, because both determine the  consumption possibilities in a  free choice
setting, and  it is a  variable  we can help  influence.  We use the  widest  possible definition of  income
including in-kind, imputed income etc.  This broad definition takes care of concerns about social services
which cannot readily been bought on the market and uses monetary equivalents for analytical purposes (see
Section IV.B).
4*  Reduce the vulnerability of low-income households with regard to consumption and
access to basic services;
*  Allow for better  consumption smoothing over the lifecycle for all households and,
consequently, for more equal welfare distribution of households;
*  Enhance equity particularly with regard to the exposure to shocks and the effects of
shocks.
In  addition,  well-designed  and  well-implemented  SP  interventions  fostered  by
government actions  contribute to  solidarity, social cohesion,  and  social stability of a
country.
Public interventions for more effective risk management can be:
*  indirect (such as fostering the capacities of households to reduce the variability of
income, improving saving capacities and risk-sharing, or facilitating the operations of
market institutions such as banks, insurance companies and pension funds) or
*  direct (such as providing transfers, subsidizing assets or goods, implementing public
works programs, or mandating old-age income insurance).
While income  risk  is considered as  individual, the  measures to  manage the risk  are
largely co-operative or social. Measures can be provided by the public or private sector,
can be either formal or informal, and can be ex-ante (prevention and mitigation) or ex-
post (coping) interventions.
C. How does thinking about SP as Social Risk Management  help
improve  our work?
Currently, social protection is often defined as a collection of measures that includes: (1)
social  assistance,  (2)  social  investment  and  development  funds,  (3)  labor  market
interventions, and (4) pensions and other insurance-type programs.  The overall concept
unifying these areas deals with improving or protecting human capital. 2 Within each of
the areas that Social Protection covers, there are, generally, a well-developed theory and
operational practice.  However,  all  too  often we  end  up  operating  within the  four
cylinders and  not  looking  at  cross-cutting  issues  or  we  do  not  analyze the  social
protection system as a whole.
There are several advantages to using  social risk management as the analytical frame-
work for social protection, including:
*  The concept is universal (i.e., time-space-independent) in that it brings a series of
different  interventions  under  one  framework  which  can  be  applied  both  to  all
2 The link with human  capital explains the  placement of  social  protection organizationally within the
human development network of the World Bank.  As discussed later in the paper, social risk management
requires  a  broad  view  of  assets,  and  improving  and/or  protecting  human  capital  is  linked  to  the
improvement and/or protection of other types of household' capital.
5countries  and  over  time.  The  appropriate mix  between  public/private,  formal/-
informal, and ex-ante/ex-post arrangements differs among countries due to types of
income  shocks,  level  of  economic  and  institutional  development,  culture  and
traditions.  This  precludes blueprints  for  countries,  but  also  avoids  seeing  each
country as specific case from which few lessons can be drawn.
*  It also provides a unifying framework to assess the economic development effects of
risk management arrangements.  While some informal risk-sharing arrangements are
rational from the individual or household point of view, they may impede economic
development.  While  some  formal  and  public  arrangements work  in  their  risk
reducing capacity, they may hinder economic growth.
*  The  concept  is  institution-oriented,  stressing  the  importance  of  functioning
informal/formal, private/public institutions and, hence, institution-building to manage
income risk optimally.  It covers the gamut of institutions from the family (and the
need  of  appropriate rules  to  prevent  child  labor  supply  and  spousal  abuse)  to
community support networks, public employment agencies, and private pension funds
(and the appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework).
*  It  forces the discussion of  appropriate interventions to  begin at the individual and
household  level. This means that all interventions (direct public provision,  public
financing,  regulations of  the  market  etc.)  should  be  judged  by  how  they  help
individuals and households to better manage risk.
Ill. Key Issues of Social  Risk Management
A.  Why are we concerned with social risk management?
There  are  four  main  reasons  why  the  World  Bank  is  concerned with  social  risk
management.  First, the fight against poverty is the central mission of the World Bank,
and  a  better  understanding can  be  achieved and improved  instruments developed  if
poverty is gauged in terms of vulnerability, that is, the increased probability of the lower
income strata to become or to remain poor.  Second, improved consumption smoothing
due  to  better  arrangements to  manage  income  risk  for  all  does  not  only  increase
individual and societal welfare, but also improves the welfare distribution in society as
well.  Third, improved equity is a major societal concern with its importance increasing
with the number and depth of income shocks. And last, the form of risk management has
an important bearing on economic development - some may hinder it, some may support
it.
Vulnerability  (within a  poverty  eradication concept)  can  be  defined  as  the  risk  of
economic units (such as individuals, households, and  communities) to  fall  below the
poverty line (i.e., having insufficient consumption and access to basic services) or, for
those already below the poverty line, to remain in or to fall further into poverty.  Anti-
vulnerability policies are designed to prevent this from happening - ex-ante - and, as a
result, to  reduce the cost of ex-post poverty alleviation measures once individuals  are
6below the poverty line.  Traditional anti-poverty policy is only concerned with bringing
individuals up to the poverty line or at least reducing the depth of poverty (Lipton and
Ravallion,  1995).  Enhancing  the  static'  anti-poverty  concept  with  the  dynamic
vulnerability concept through  risk  management measures  should prove  to  be  welfare
enhancing.  It will also build concern for the social and economic processes that drive
movements around and below the poverty line.  This, in turn, will provide focus on the
development (dynamic aspects) of poverty eradication and the social context in which
vulnerability reduction must take place (including highlighting the importance of social
exclusion and marginalization).
Special cases are the individuals at the bottom of the income distribution.  These people
are so close to a "survival line" that they become extremely risk adverse, and exhibit
other non-linearities in behavior and outcome (Ravallion, 1997).  In our understanding,
these  people  are  the  most  vulnerable.  For  individuals  higher  up  in  the  income
distribution,  small  shocks  (i.e.,  loss  of  income)  may  have  the  same  probability  of
occurring as for those in the lower strata.  The severity of the effect, however, will be
lower because they can rely  on  accumulated assets while, for the  people  close to  a
survival line, all shocks are catastrophic and endanger even the most basic consumption
(Jalan and Ravallion, 1998).  Even though this is a  special case, the basic conceptual
framework still applies.  The goal is to help these people better manage their risks - they
just have an extreme form of risk and almost no capacity to manage risk by themselves.
The intervention most often used is a direct transfer (in-kind or in-cash, by the state or
community members) or an asset reallocation. This lifts the household far enough above
the "survival line" to allow them to take more risk and engage in higher return activities.
Consumption  smoothing  and  welfare  distribution:  Economic  considerations  and
empirical  evidence  suggest  that  economic  units  have  a  preference  for  smooth
consumption, spreading the consumptive use of expected income over a long period, even
a lifetime (Alderman and Paxson,  1992; Besley, 1995; Deaton, 1997; Gerowitz, 1988).
Because income realization is mostly stochastic and, during periods of negative shocks,
income can be very low or  even negative, this requires appropriate risk  management
instruments, such as saving  and dis-saving possibilities in order to  achieve a welfare-
enhancing smooth consumption path. Yet, societal welfare is not only increased because
the welfare of all individuals rises.
If  society  values  a  more  equal  welfare  distribution  across  individuals,  better  risk
management can enhance the welfare distribution and societal welfare without actually
re-distributing income among  individuals.  Under the  likely  scenario  that  the lower
income  strata is more constrained  with  consumption smoothing capacities,  enhanced
public support for risk management arrangements lifts the constraints on the welfare level
of  this  income segment to  a  larger  extent, leading  to  a  more  equal  distribution of
individual welfare. 3
3Simulations  suggest  that  this effect of risk management  dominates  the income  re-distributive  effect  for a
large set of parameters.  See,  Holzmann  (1990).
7Improved  Equity  is  a  main  objective  of  SRM.  The  importance  of  direct  public
interventions for  equity reasons  increases once the  concept  of  shocks  is taken  into
consideration.  The discussion of equity is traditionally gauged in two polar concepts:
equity of opportunity and equity of outcome. While libertarians support the former, more
leftist positions  support the  latter and consider the first  insufficient.  The concept of
equity of opportunity has much appeal if resulting differences in income distribution are
due to differences in individual efforts only, but it falters if main shocks threatening the
survival of individuals are  taken into account, strengthening the  demand for  ex-post
corrections.  The concept of equity of outcome has a lot of appeal on moral grounds, but
it falters once changes in  individual behavior are accounted for.  As  a  consequence,
improving equity treads a  fine line between the minimum concept of  furthering equal
opportunity and the maximum concept of attempting equal outcome.
Economic Development:  The instruments of social risk management are not neutral in
economic development (Ahmad, Dreze, and Sen, 1991).  Sending children to work as a
measure to cope with income loss by the household is detrimental to their future income
chances  and the growth of the economy.  Providing  overly generous  public pension
benefits financed by labor taxes is likely to distort individual labor supply and saving
decisions with static and dynamic efficiency losses.  Risk management instruments may
also foster economic development.  A functioning family is, perhaps, the best instrument
to reduce and mitigate individual income risk.  Appropriately regulated and supervised
funded pension provisions may contribute to financial market development and economic
growth.  Hence, risk management arrangements need to be carefully evaluated, changed
or re-designed in order to maximize their contribution to the development of our client
countries.
B.  How to conceptualize social risk management?
We will  suggest a typology for types of  risk, strategies,  instruments and  institutions
involved in risk management.  This section briefly introduces the typology while the
following sections (C through F) goes into more detail, explaining what we mean by the
different definitions. The basic typology breaks down into four main categories
I. The type of income risk incurred, with three main distinctions:
*  Catastrophic vs. non-catastrophic shocks
*  Idiosyncratic vs. covariant shocks
*  Single vs. repeated shocks
II. The type of strategies to address these income shocks with three main distinctions and
subcategories:
*  Risk reduction strategies (introduced ex-ante  in  order to  increase  the level  of
expected income and/or reduce the variance) such as active labor market policies.
*  Risk  mitigating strategies (introduced  ex-ante  in  order to  reduce  the  income
variance with occasional costs for the expected income) in the form of:
*  Portfolio diversification (multiple assets with different risk characteristics)
*  Insurance (pooled coverage through payment of insurance premium)
8*  Hedging (risk exchange)
*  Risk-coping strategies (introduced ex-post, i.e., once the risk has occurred) such
as dis-saving/borrowing, charity, means-tested transfers and public works.
III.  The  type  of  instruments  by  the  formality  of  arrangements,  with  three  main
distinctions:
*  Informal/personal arrangements (such as  marriage, mutual  community support,
and real assets such as cattle, estate and gold)
*  Formal/market  based  arrangements (such  as  financial  assets  and  insurance
contracts)
*  Formal/publicly  mandated  or  provided  arrangements  (such  as  rules  and
regulations, social insurance, transfers, and public works)




- Market institutions (such as banks and insurance companies)
G  Governnent
C. What are the risks considered?  - a typology  of risks
Income risks have many forms. They may affect individuals/households as a result of
sickness, unemployment or bad harvest, or they may hit a  whole community or even
country as a result of epidemics, natural disaster, environmental problems or inflation.
For a better understanding of the possible policy responses and applicable instruments,
there  are  three  important  categories  that  aid  in  the  classification  of  the  main
circumstances with which individuals/households  must cope (Murdoch 1997).
Catastrophic vs. non-catastrophic shocks: In the life of a household, some events occur
with low frequency, but have severe income effects - like old-age, death in the family,
and disabling accidents or illnesses, permanent unemployment, and  the technological
redundancy of skills.  These catastrophic events can hit households hard and may require
a continuing flow of transfers to the affected household if it cannot  acquire sufficient
assets.
At the other end of the scale are high  frequency  events with non-severe income effects -
like transient illness, crop loss, and temporary unemployment.  Protection  against these
non-catastrophic  events  need  not  require  long-term  net  transfers  to  the  afflicted
household.  If appropriate mechanisms are available, households may use savings, loans,
or reciprocal gifts with no net transfers from others over time.
Idiosyncratic shocks vs. covariant shocks: The second important distinction is whether or
not only some households in a community suffer losses (idiosyncratic shocks like non-
communicative illness or frictional unemployment) or whether all are hit at the same time
(covariant shocks like drought, inflation or financial crisis).  Many more mechanisms are
9available for coping with idiosyncratic shocks than covariant shocks.  The latter can be
particularly devastating, leaving households with nowhere in the community to turn for
relief  It should be remembered, however, that, for poor and isolated households, even
idiosyncratic shocks might be difficult to cope with.
Single vs. Repeated shocks: A third distinction concerns shocks following one another -
like drought followed by sickness and death.  The recurring nature is also referred to as
the degree of autocorrelation  and highly autocorrelated events are typically difficult to
handle through informal means.
D. What  are  the  main  strategies to  address income  risk?  -
a typology  of strategies
Background: In  a  world with  complete  information, all  of  the  shocks  above could
potentially be addressed with market-based solutions. Each risk would be known, have a
price, and able-bodied individuals could fully insure themselves against them.  All non-
able-bodied persons (the deserving) would rely on public or private transfers provided for
altruistic or other reasons.  Yet, complete information is only a theoretical benchmark
while asymmetric information in the real world gives rise to:
*  transaction costs (and the non-existence of formal inter-temporal market institutions
in many developing countries); and
*  moral hazard, adverse selection, and insufficient property rights (and the existence of
publicly supported and/or mandated provisions).
*  As  a  further  implication of  asymmetric  information, the  risk  distribution  is  not
necessarily exogenous, but can be influenced by government measures.  Insurance,
even if it exists, is not necessarily the best ex-ante strategy compared to pre-saving,
for example. And, in face of catastrophic/covariant/repeated shocks, there is a need
for ex-post interventions.
In an imperfect world, there are many strategies to help households better manage income
risks (Alderman and Paxson, 1992). These can be grouped in three broad categories 4:
*  Prevention strategies - to reduce the occurrence of the risk giving rise to income
loss.  They are introduced ex-ante in order to increase the level of expected income
and to reduce the income variance.
*  Mitigation strategies - to mollify  the risks through improvement or provision of
instruments which reduce the income variance ex-ante with  occasional costs to the
expected income.
4For  a different taxonomy of risk addressing strategies,  see Townsend  (1994).  The proposed broad
differentiation  between ex-ante and ex-post measures, however,  falls short of distinguishing  between
measures  which prevent or reduce the risk to occur, and those which attempt to mitigate  the risk for
exogenously  given risk distributions.
10Types of capital and social risk management
For social  risk management the  definition  of assets needs to be  very broad.  It would still include
physical capital (land, buildings, and livestock), financial and human capital, but should also include
social capital (belonging to groups with trust and high levels of cohesion) and the  family structure itself
(Davies, 19988; Ellis, 1998; Moser, 1998).  While our theoretical constructs still have a long way to go
in  just  coming to grips with an operational definition of social capital and an asset-like application of
family  structure, practical  experience and  statistical evidence suggests  their importance in an  asset
management framework.
For instance in poor households in many parts of the world, preference  is given to expenditures that
invest in social capital over investments in human capital.  E.g., the household prioritizes gift giving
and costs  associated with rituals  over paying  school fees.  The giving  of gifts and participation  in
rituals, is a form  of membership fee  to belong to a certain social group, i.e., an investment in social
capital. Much of the  literature on women, focus  on the role of  investing in family  structure.  E.g.,
women give up ajob with a higher return for the  "protection of the family. "
Other examples  indicate that the level social  capital (measured via  a trust  index or a participation
index) is positively related with GDP per capita and has a positive impact on economic growth. Hence,
appropriate  inivestment in  "social capital"  is a  means to improve  income conditions and reduce
poverty, but the wvays  need still to be explored
- Coping  strategies - to relieve the impact of the shock;  to improve instruments or
provide transfers and other income support measures once the negative income shock
has occurred.
(i)  Strategies to prevent or reduce the occurrence of income risks by all economic actors,
but mostly by governments, have a very broad range that surpasses the traditional scope
of social protection.  These strategies  are comprised of sound economic policy, public
health policy, environmental policy,  dam construction, and many more areas of public
intervention.
Preventive social risk management is typically linked with measures to reduce the risk for
income generation, notably  for labor.  It  is  concerned with  labor standards  because
occupational health risks impede future labor income and  abusive child labor impairs
health, education, and the emotional stability of children and their income chances as
adults.  It is concerned with vocational education and technical training because lower-
skilled workers are more vulnerable to income risk and a well-trained labor force can
better cope with macroeconomic and  structural shocks.  It is also concerned with  the
(mal-) functioning of the labor market, resulting from bad labor market regulations, wage
setting agreements or overly high minimum wages which lead to labor market imbalances
and the resulting income loss due to  unemployment.  But pro-active policies are also
applied once the reduction in ability to obtain gainful employment has occurred, such as
for the disabled, where policies are designed and implemented to enhance their earning
chances, reduce their vulnerability and dependence on private and public transfers.
(ii) Strategies to mitigate ex-ante income risks can take various forms including assisting
with portfolio diversification, insurance, and hedging. The objective of these actions is to
I1reduce the variability of income if a shock were to occur.  While these actions can happen
informally (through personal contracts and networks) or formally (through  anonymous
market  relations),  the government  can improve  the  efficiency  or  equity  of  existing
instruments or provide or mandate the provision of instruments.  Again, many of these
actions transcend traditional  social  protection policies.  For  example,  providing  the
information on field and crop diversification or weather patterns will help reduce harvest
and income risk.
A central instrument to reduce the variability of income consists of relying on various
assets from which returns are not perfectly correlated, i.e., portfolio diversification (Ellis,
1998). This requires the acquisition and management of different assets such as physical
capital, financial capital and human  capital in their  different  forms.  For example, if
individuals  can  only  invest  in  human  capital,  they  can  still  diversify  in  different
occupations, but perhaps at the detriment of the average return.  If individuals can only
invest in physical capital and cannot diversify, they may choose a lower return with a less
risky technology.  If women cannot own or inherit  land and  have no  access to  safe
financial  instruments, they may  acquire  gold  and  jewels.  Government  policy  that
improves the access to different assets not only allows a better risk mitigation, but may
allow for high rates of return as well.
The second and perhaps most important form of risk mitigation comes in the form of
informal and formal insurance.  It is easy to state the characteristics of formal or market
based insurance - the payment of a risk-based insurance premium gives rise to future
state-contingent payments.  Informal insurance arrangements are a bit trickier to describe
in that they come in different and often disguised forms because one "institution" serves
insurance and non-insurance type functions (such  as the  family  and the community).
This mix and the basis of informal insurance - trust as a result of repeated interactions -
renders the involvement of government to strengthen the insurance function hazardous.
Furthermore, some economists argue that mutual insurance is alien to traditional agrarian
societies and, while those informal mechanisms provide insurance, they are guided more
.5 by a principle of balanced reciprocity .
While  hedging  has  an  increasing  importance  for  financial  markets  (e.g.,  forward
exchange rate contracts) and is based on risk exchange or payment of a risk premium to
somebody for taking over the risk,  these arrangements do not  appear  to  work in  an
income-related  environment  and  formal  provisions.  The  effects  of  asymmetrical
information  are too  strong.  However, elements  can  be  found  in  informal/personal
arrangements.  For example, various  family arrangements or some labor contracts are
more germane to hedging than insurance.
' Balanced  reciprocity  means  that for any "gift" there  is a strong  assumption  that at some, as yet unknown,
time in the future there will be a counter gift.  Hence informal insurance arrangements may be similar to a
loan where the repayment loan is state contingent (e.g. see Plateau  1996,  Ligon et al. 1997).  Evidence for
the latter is provided by Udry (1990;  1994) for Nigeria.  On  average a borrower with  good realization
repays 20.4% more than he has borrowed while a borrower with bad realization repays 0.6% less than he
borrowed.  Moreover, repayment  are  contingent  on the  lender's  realization.  A  lender  with  a  good
realization receives on average 5% less than  he lent, but a  lender with a bad realization receives  11.8%
more than he lent.
12(iii) Coping - to alleviate the impact of  Dis-saving in human capital
the  shock once  it  has  occurred.  The  An extreme  forn  of dis-saving  is in human
main  forms  of  coping  consist  of  capital.  There are many examples from
individual  saving/dis-saving  - Africa  and other  low-income  countries  (e.g.,
borrowing/repayment or the reliance on  World Bank (94)) of how people when
non-requitable  public  or  private  faced  with a shock cut back on the number
transfers.  Despite  these  formal  and  and size of meals.  I.E., a direct dis-saving
informal  instruments,  the  government  in human capital - because this is often the
Informal  instruments,  the  governmnent  only asset that they possess. Unfortunately
has  an  important role  in  coping  with  there is no way to recuperate this loss, if the
income variability once the risk/loss has  lack of meals affect children at certain ages.
occurred.  Individual  households  may  This is another example of how a family
not  have  saved  enough  to  cope  with  risk management strategy is good in the noltiple  or  longer  lasting  shocks,  short run, but is detrimental over a longer
multiple  or  longer  lastig  shocks,  run.
running  out  of  financial  resources  to
finance their consumption.  Households
may have accumulated important assets for old age, but are faced with the uncertainty of
length of life span.  De-cumulating the assets over the uncertain remaining life span may
leave them with too little consumption at high age or too much (unintended) bequests at
early death  if  the assets  cannot be  converted  into a  (fair) annuity  stream.  Finally,
individuals may have been poor for their entire lifetime with no possibility to accumulate
assets at all, being rendered destitute by the smallest income loss.
E.  The type of instruments  by the formality of arrangements  - a
typology  of instruments
The  level  of formality can distinguish the  instruments/arrangements used  under each
strategy. Three distinctions are proposed:
*  Informal/personal arrangements (such as marriage, mutual community support, and
real assets such as cattle, estate and gold);
*  Formal/market based arrangements (such as financial assets and insurance contracts);
*  Formal/publicly mandated or provided arrangements (such as rules and regulations,
social insurance, transfers, and public works).
(i)  Informal/personal arrangements: With  the  lack  of  market  institutions  and  public
provisions,  the  response  by  individual  households  is  self-protection  through
informal/personal  arrangements.  This  sidesteps  most  information  and  coordination
problems, but may be lirmited in its effectiveness.  Examples include: the buying and
selling of real assets; informal borrowing and lending; crop and field diversification; the
use of safer production technologies (such as growing less risky crops); and the storing of
goods  for  future  consumption.  Lacking  formal  (anonymous)  insurance  markets
households may also engage in personalized insurance, i.e., informal risk sharing.  They
build  on  direct  information (which  avoids  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection) and
relationships developed over years or generations (trust).  Examples include: marriage
and  the extended family  (and the implicit  exchange provisions); remittances  between
friends  and  neighbors;  investing in  social  capital;  engaging  in  share  tenancy; credit
13contracts with  state-contingent repayment; and the commitment to long-term contracts
that guarantee a steady flow of income (tied labor).
A main advantage of informal insurance arrangements is the close interpersonal relation-
ship and, in view of the good information base, the virtual absence of moral hazard and
adverse selection.  This comparative informational advantage of private agents with local
knowledge speaks in favor of private arrangements strengthened by government actions.
On the other hand, many elements of such arrangements may appear at odds with familial
values such as  the  strong  position of  the  (male)  household head to  ensure  contract
compliance or the forced marriage of (female) members to distant location to ensure risk
diversification.
(ii) Formal/market based arrangements: With the existence of market-based institutions
such as money, banks, and insurance companies for intertemporal exchange, individual
households will also use these instruments for managing income risks.  But, in view of
their limitations due to asymmetric information, their use will be restricted.  Their use,
however, will rise with financial market development.
Financial saving as well as the accumulation of other assets that can be sold at fair market
prices is perhaps  the  most  important asset  management instruments  used to  address
income variability.  Pre-saving is inferior to full and fair insurance in as much as it leads
to discontinuities in the consumption path (if the income risk no longer exists and the
savings is now spent) or to lower lifetime consumption and lifetime utility (if the saving
is involuntarily passed on as inheritance).  Yet, if no fair insurance arrangements exist,
pre-saving is powerful  instrument to cope with high frequency and non-autocorrelated
income shocks for the poor.  This empirical evidence suggests that the establishment of a
sound banking system and non-inflationary policy is an important device to cope with
consumption vulnerability.
Similar considerations apply to the capacities of individuals to borrow during periods of
income loss.  Assets may exist, but prices may be temporarily low, transaction costs high
or the individual household may not have had the time to accumulate.  Borrowing is also
important to buy for inputs during period of low cash income and to secure future income
streams.  Because formal market institutions are reluctant to lend to households without
secured eamings, micro-financing is an important instrument of social risk management.
In  the  case  of  barriers  to  trade  such  as  private  (asymmetric) information,  limited
communication, and limited legal systems, efficient credit delivery systems of financial
institutions may require explicit or implicit insurance provisions in loan contracts.  And,
in doing so, makes (public) interventions in favor of women, poor, and remote areas a
redistributive instrument of social policy.
The early acquisition of life savings accounts and annuity contracts allows the handling
of catastrophic shocks from disability and old age.  Similarly, buying health, property,
and crop insurance and saving and borrowing facilities aid in the management of high
frequency downturns.  Yet, market-based arrangements may not be able to cope with the
consequences  of  asymmetric  information (moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection) and
14provide unemployment insurance or pension annuities only at grossly actuarially unfair
prices.
(iii) Formal/publicly mandated or provided arrangements:  To overcome the effects of
adverse selection,  governments can  mandate insurance of  all  unemployed  (pooling),
pursue meritorious  goals (income redistributing and coping with myopia) or safeguard
the government against strategic behavior of individuals as a result of minimum benefits.
It can mandate or provide insurance for old age, disability, survivorship, accident, and
sickness. In addition, the government has a whole array of instruments to cope with the
consumption  effect of lost income.  The choice will not only  depend on distributive
concerns, but also on the available fiscal resources and administrative capacities, and the
type of shock.  It will also depend on efficiency concerns because the forn  of provision
will impact individual labor supply and saving decisions that the government can only
monitor insufficiently.  Governments may provide public works at below market wage.
This self-targeting instrument can substitute for, or complement unemployment benefits.
Governments can provide social assistance benefits in-cash or kind in a targeted manner
(i.e., means tested) for all below a determined poverty line.  Or governments can provide
a minimum  income in  a  universal manner to  the total  population  (demogrants)  or a
subgroup (such as the elderly).
Table I fills the intersection of main strategies and arrangements with typical examples.
F.  Institutional  roles  - who does  what  in social risk management
Because the issue of social risk management emerges as a result of private (asymmetric)
information, the role of the actors/institutions can be seen in their capacity to best cope
with information asymmetry.  But  because this asymmetry also gives rise to  imperfect
market  institutions  (market  failure)  as  well as  non-benevolent  government behavior
(policy failures), the relative roles have to be viewed in perspective.
Because individuals/households have all the private information, most risk management
can take place on the household level.  Risk-mitigating strategies through the acquisition
of different  assets  and risk-coping strategies through  accumulation and  decumulation
decisions optimize the consumption path to a large extent.  But, in view of insufficient
market institutions (such as access to credit), not all decisions are socially desirable even
though they may be perfectly rational for the individual or the household.  For instance,
taking girls out of school to help fetch water during a drought may be rational in view of
lacking  access to  credit, but the  loss to  society is much  greater than the  short term
individual gain. SP interventions need to  be designed so they work with and build on
such strategies.  Instead of lowering the cost of schooling, it may be more appropriate
from a societal point of view to invest in a better water supply closer to the village or to
provide better access to credit.
Next  to  households,  communities have a large stock of  private  information.  Hence,
lacking the appropriate market institutions, communities have developed various informal
mechanism of risk-sharing in developing countries. Examples include 'susu'  schemes in
West Africa; mutual support arrangements reinforced through  celebrations and rituals;
15Table  1: Strategies  and Arrangements  of Social  Risk Management
Arrangement  Informal/Personal  Formal/ Financial  Formal/Publicly-
Strategies  market-based  mandated/Provided
Risk reduction





Multiple jobs  Investment in multiple  Multi-pillar pension
Portfolio  Investment in  financial assets  systems
human, physical and  Social Investment
real assets  Funds
Asset transfers
Marriage/family  Old-age annuities  Mandated/provided
Insurance  Community  Disability/Accident  insurance for unem-
arrangements  ployment, old age,
Share tenancy  disability, survivor-
Tied labor  ship, sickness, etc.
Hedging  Extended family
Labor contracts
Risk coping
Selling of real assets  Selling of financial  Transfers/Social
Borrowing from  assets  assistance
neighbors  Borrowing from  Subsidies






and  burial  societies  in  Andean  countries.  But  while  those  mechanisms  may  provide
informal  insurance,  some  of them  may  be  socially  undesirable  because  they  perpetuate
dependency  structures or impede  on economic  development.
NGOs  may  not have  as much  private  inforrnation  as tightly-knit  communities,  but  their
local  and  informal  character  allows  them to  monitor  individual  behavior  better  then  full-
blown  market  institutions.  This  explains  the  existence  and  importance  of  NGO-
sponsored  savings  and  micro-credit  schemes  in  many  countries.  The  latter  may  also  be
provided  by  Social  Investment  Funds  which  have  the  rationale  of  efficiently  circum-
venting  (inefficient)  public  administration  and  being  demand-driven  and,  consequently,
also able to cope with information  asymmetry.
16Market institutions  such  as  banks  and  insurance  companies  have to  rely  on public
information and, as a result, cope with issues of moral hazard and adverse selection.  On
the other hand,  if well-regulated and  supervised, the  shareholder value concept leads
them to transparency and high efficiency providing individuals nationwide with the broad
variety  of  risk  management  instruments.  Market  institutions  in  a  competitive
environment, however,  can  also  be  efficient  instruments  to  deliver  public  services
financed by the public sector (such as job placement, social assistance payments, etc.).
The main challenge in coping with this new principal-agent problem between the public
and private sector institutions is to draft contracts that circumvent the private information
problem as much as possible.
Finally, the government has many important roles in the area of social risk management.
The most  important of these  roles  are: (i)  facilitating  the set-up of financial market
institutions  to  this  end;  (ii)  establishing  the  regulatory  and  supervisory framework,
including  a  transparency requirement  and  consumer  information; (iii) providing risk
management  instruments where  the  private sector  fails  (unemployment insurance) or
individuals lack the information for self-provisions (myopia); (iv) providing social safety
nets and large scale transfers in the case of main or recurrent shocks; and (v) providing
income distribution if the market  outcome is considered unacceptable from a societal
welfare point of view.
IV. Boundaries  and Balances  of Social Protection  as Social  Risk
Management
Defining  Social  Protection  as  SRM  raises  many  key  questions,  including:  (A) the
delineation with other sectors; (B) the role and  scope of distributive policies; (C) the
impact  of  risk  management,  or  its  absence,  on  static  and  dynamic  efficiency,  i.e.,
economic development and growth; and (D) the political  sustainability of the proposed
best technical solution.
A.  Boundaries  with other sectors
There are many overlaps with what falls under SP and what is covered by other sectors,
particularly  in  the area  of  risk  prevention  and  reduction.  Any  economic and  other
governmental policy that enhances growth and reduces income variability also supports
the objectives of SP. This means that there is a need for delineation at the analytical and
institutional levels.  This does not mean that the SP strategy for a country should not
begin with raising the awareness  of a  sound and  credible economic policy  as being
crucial for a well-functioning SRM system.
(i) Building greater awareness about the importance of  broad policies to  create a less
risky environment for households  and  conmmunities  is  primordial.  There is  still  an
insufficient understanding among academics in the developed world and policy makers in
client countries of sound macroeconomic policy, sound financial markets, enforcement of
property rights, respect of basic labor rights, or growth-oriented policies as the first and
best ingredients to reduce the consumption effects of variable income.  If those policies
17are  in  place,  households  are  much  less  vulnerable and  can  achieve  most  of  their
consumption  smoothing with  personal instruments.  This  calls for measures to  build
greater awareness within client countries and among donors.
(ii) There may be a specific role in SP alerting other sectors that preventive measures are
required and  are cost efficient in present value calculation.  Recent examples are the
effects of  "El  Nifno" and the  welfare  implications of this  catastrophic shock  for the
concerned worldwide population.  Ex post measures of the government to cope with the
income effects may prove more expensive in present value terms than ex ante measures
in the area of public infrastructure (Vos and de Labadista 1998).
(iii) Among  the specific measures  to reduce the income risk ex-ante, there are many
measures that potentially transcend other sectors.  The suggested analytical delineation is
based on labor market relations with SP taking care of measures which reduce the risk of
wage income  variability,  leaving the  risk reduction policies  for  other incomes (from
physical and financial capital) to other sectors.  While better functioning labor markets
contribute to  enhanced  human  capital,  there  are other  sectors  that  contribute to  its
protection and improvement (such as education and health).
(iv)  The  common  goal  of  improving  human  capital  or  reducing  income  risks  in
agriculture where income accrues to households through joint  input of labor, land and
capital creates  areas of joint  ownership of cross-sector activities.  Examples include:
vocational education and technical training, child labor, disability, and micro-finance.  In
these areas of joint  ownership,  an institutional delineation is suggested with the lead
taken by one sector, joint work or full integration of work depending on the budgetary,
personal, and institutional setting.
B. Scope,  form,  and  limits of re-distributive  activities
On the  surface,  SRM  does  little  to  provide  a  role for  the  re-distributive  activities
traditionally seen as a core element of SP (or the welfare state, see Barr, 1998).  This
impression may  result  from  the  fact  that,  in  a  SRM  setting,  there  is  a  more  than
interpersonal redistribution to enhance the welfare distribution of  households, cohorts,
and  generations.  Improved  inter-temporal  distribution  of  income  allows  better
consumption smoothing and is welfare  enhancing without a re-distribution of income
among individuals or cohorts taking place. For example, a re-designed pension system in
view of population aging can contribute to inter-generation equality without an explicit
redistribution between cohorts.  Still, four issues deserve special attention: (i) resource
flows from the "better-off'  towards the most vulnerable and lifetime poor; (ii) non-social
income;  (iii)  issues  of  social  inclusion/solidarity/cohesion/stability;  and  (iv)
generation/regional/inter-country inequality needing to be addressed.
(i) The mission  of poverty reduction  dictates that waiting for economic growth to  lift
everybody above the poverty line is insufficient. At least a minimal amount of resources
are needed to help cope with the most drastic forms of poverty. This traditional  anti-
poverty concern is the reason for social safety net/social assistance programs worldwide.
The concept of vulnerability supports these poverty concems, but puts them in a dynamic
18framework  in  which  the  risk  of  becoming  poor  is  also  accounted  for,  and  risk
management mechanisms are assessed in their capacity to minimize this probability in
distributive effectiveness and dynamic efficiency terms. Within the traditional poverty
view, the level of poverty and available budgetary resources of a country as well as its
preferences determine the scope of such interventions. For example, if 60 percent of the
population  live below  $2 per  day, the  budgetary resources  may not  be  available to
address deep poverty.  The form of intervention is, in part, determined by efficiency
considerations,  i.e.,  supporting the  poor  while  minimizing  distortionary  effects  and
poverty traps.
(ii) The concept of SRM is largely, but not exclusively focused on income variability
with income very broadly defined and encompassing market income, imputed income,
income in-kind, etc. This broad definition of income takes care of concerns about social
services that  cannot  readily be  bought on the  market.  These services require public
intervention through public provision, financing or regulation to force private provisions
(such as rules for  children to take care of their elderly parents).  Hence, SRM is  not
restricted to the monetary aspects of income/consumption support for the vulnerable poor
of the society, but merely emphasizes the income equivalent for analytical reasons.
(iii) There are, of course, other aspects of SP that cannot readily be  cast into income
equivalents.  The most important of these are concerns for social exclusion/inclusion,
The three  main political  paradigms  of social exclusion
The first  paradigm  is usually  coined the solidarity  paradigm  with exclusion  defined  as  "the rupture  of
a social  bond  between  the individual  and the society,  referred  to as social  solidarity.  "  A society  is
characterized  by cultural  boundaries,  by which  the poor,  ethnic minorities  or unemployed  end up as
deviant  outsiders.  The source  of integration  of these groups  would be  "moral  integration.  " The state  is
obliged  to aid in the insertion  of the excluded.
The second paradigm,  represented  by Anglo American  liberalism,  draws  exclusion  as a consequence
of specialization,  which  refers  to social  differentiation,  economic  division  of labor  and  a separation  of
life spheres.  The mere fact  that individuals  differ  does  notyet  raise concern.  It is the discrimination
aspect that is seen  as a problem.  Separation  of spheres  would not lead to hierarchically  ordered social
categories,  if individuals  were free  to move across  boundaries.  In a liberal  view of society  the
contractual  exchange  of individual  rights  is a basis  of welfare.  If this exchange,  if mobility  between
spheres  is impossible,  then division  of labor may  end up in social  exclusion.
The third paradigm  sees exclusion  as a consequence  of the formation  of group  monopoly.  "Powerful
groups,  often with  distinctive  cultural  identities  and  institutions  restrict  the access  of outsiders  to
valued resources  through  a process  of social  closure  ". A good example  is labor  market  segmentation
that draws  boundaries  of exclusion  between  and  within firms.  While in the specialization  paradigm  the
source  of integration  is exchange,  the monopoly  paradigm  relies on citizens'  rights  as a means to
change  the status  of exclusion.
Source:  Silver  (1995) and  Badelt  (1998).
social solidarity, social cohesion, and social stability. In order to address these qualitative
objectives of social policy, a clear definition is required for deternining  the appropriate
instruments. With regard to social exclusion, various definitions exist (see box) with the
19solidarity paradigm the most used and, likely, the most useful one.  Largely independent
of a precise definition, all dimensions of these qualitative social policy objectives - social
inclusion, solidarity, cohesion, and  stability - can be  defined as positive  externalities
resulting  from  a  well  designed  and  implemented  SRM  in  view  of  asymmetric
information.  For example, a well designed income support system for unemployed will
not only enhance individual welfare through lower vulnerability and better consumption
smoothing, but will also carry toward the qualitative objectives such as social stability.
Furthermore, effective social risk management strategies will have to take account of the
gender dimension (see box).
SRM and Gender
Effective  SRM strategies need to  include an  understanding  of how gender relations affect the
implementation  and impact of different  policies or programs. It is essential in developing  SRM
approaches  that a clear recognition  of the different  roles of men and women  shape  how  policies are
designed  and  carried  out.  The  structure  of gender  roles and expectations  help shape  the capacity  of
women,  households  and communities  to  absorb  and  adjust  to economic  shocks.
Policies of Social Risk Management  thus require a gender lens that incorporates  the needs of
individuals  into a wider set of social and economic  relations.  For example, in terms of gender
perspectives,  these can include  such factors as labor markets,  credit markets, social conventions,
dynamics  of localfood  availability,  or women  's  participation  in key  tradable  'sectors.
Development  of SRM  strategies  can include  an analysis  of the demands  on women  in the household  or
family life.  The  design of SRM programs  as related to potential economic  shocks can incorporate
past experiences  that  guide  formulating  gender  aspects  of  prevention  and  coping  systems.
(iv) Last but not least, SP raises the issue of income redistribution between generations,
regions or nations.  Distributive issues between generations emerge when public transfer
programs increase current period consumption at the cost of capital stock formation and,
thus, at the detriment of the incomes of future generations or when an aging population
squeezes the  consumption possibilities  of  the  active generation.  Important  regional
income differences in a country, federation or supra-national body (such as the EU) raise
the issue to  what extent an income redistribution should take place  to support income
convergence (through  transfers  enhancing capital  accumulation) or  equal  social  and
economic conditions (though transfers increasing the  consumption possibility), and the
conditions  under  which  these  transfers  are  effective  (Herve  and  Holzmann,  1998).
Finally, the large and often rising income differences between the rich (northern) and the
poor (southern) countries give rise to claims  of needed redistribution in a  globalized
world (Deacon et al., 1997).  Those issues, while clearly important, transcend SP and
touch  on  many questions  of  macro,  fiscal,  and  international economics  as  well  as
international welfare economics for which the analytical basis, economic effects, and best
instruments are not yet fully established.
C. Economic  development  issues
SRM is not neutral to economic development: it may support it through the choice of
more productive production technologies, and the way gender is dealt with (see box) but
20it may also hamper it through the elimination of risk and changes in individual behavior.
This renders the choice of risk management instruments an important tool for economic
development and may give rise to a trade-off between short-term effectiveness and long-
term dynamic efficiency.
(i) There are many arguments for the view that insufficient risk management instruments
impede efficient decisions and economic growth.  Because the poor are risk averse, the
absence of adequate risk instruments makes them pay an even higher price and, hence,
contributes to poverty.  There are various ways in which this can occur. One way is via
effects on production decisions.  For example, outmoded agricultural technologies can
persist  because they are less risky  and credit  is  scarce.  Another  channel  is through
portfolio  behavior.  By this  argument,  uninsured  risk  induces poor  credit-constraint
households to hold unproductive wealth.  Lastly, one channel is through the investment in
human capital.  It is argued that lacking access to credits means poor families must pull
their children out of school to provide labor in the face of an income shortfall (see box).
Against  this background (which has  economic appeal  and some  supporting  empirical
evidence), it is suggested that the provision of adequate risk management  instruments
allows  the  choice of  more efficient  production  technologies, portfolio  selections  or
decisions for human capital formation.
SRM  and Children
Children tend to be invisible in the shaping of policies on poverty reduction  and risk management.
Generally children are incorporated  into the category of the  "household", but this can obscure
important  distinctions  in terms of age and gender. Attention  to children  in SRM initiatives  should  give
attention  where  possible  to the socialfabric  of the community  rather  than  individualized  interventions.
At times of economic  shocks,  parents and communities  face  hard decisions  in regards to schooling,
work and residence. What  are adaptive  strategies  that can help children  balance work and school?
Boys tend to work  more  directly  in income  earning  settings,  while  girls  often  respond by taking  on more
household  responsibilities.  Both take part in household  enterprises  depending  upon the locale and
economic  needs.
SRM strategies  can identify  key indicators  and areas of vulnerability  in the lives of children,  and  thus
shape  prevention  and  coping  programs.  SRM approaches  can  provide  support  for the  fabric of the local
community in order to reduce the pressures on children to live on the street or accept harsh
employment  conditions.  SRM can also identify  programs with local organizations  that can remove
children  from harmful  or at risk  settings, as the costs to children  already  at risk will increase  in times
of economic  shock.
(ii) Full insurance against risks allows a choice on the efficiency frontier based on risk
preferences.  However, private  and  public insurance  is characterized  by  asymmetric
information leading to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.  As a result and
as noted above, private insurance markets may not be established or may not be efficient.
The public provision of insurance against income risk may improve the outcome for a
wide range of risks, but may also reduce individual efforts (such as job search) or lead to
taking too much risk.  And may end up in a worse situation than without such protection.
21It is often feared that the reduction in individual effort may be compounded by pervasive
income distribution that is often part of public welfare systems.  In addition, welfare state
interventions may imply a  redistribution paradox where  more redistribution results  in
more inequality (Sinn, 1994).  This calls for a careful analytic and empirical assessment
of publicly provided and managed risk management instruments.
(iii) Starting with informal SRM instruments in less developed economies, one can also
be  confronted  with  a  trade-off  between  distributive  effectiveness  versus  dynamic
efficiency.  A wide variety of informal arrangements may be effective in providing risk
mitigation for the covered group, but it may come at high costs for current and future
income, particularly for the poor.  On the other hand, many publicly provided alternatives
appear costly in the short run because additional budgetary resources have to be raised
and harmful  distortions and  disincentives are introduced.  De-placing informal  with
public arrangements may imply long-term efficiency gains  if, for example, repressive
informal institutional structures and low-level production technologies are replaced.
D. Political  sustainability  issues
Discussions about the SP programs (or more generally about the welfare state) have long
been seen in a  simple trade-off between equity and efficiency once the social welfare
function over  individual income positions is defined.  Yet, the experience with public
interventions and attempted reforms has taught us that the best technical solution may not
be politically sustainable.  As a result, the original, first, best design is blurred or totally
reversed, while changes to a potentially sustainable second best solution prove politically
difficult or even impossible.  This suggests that considerations of political economy have
to be part of system design and reforms.  And the simple trade-off has to be extended to a
"menage-a-trois": equity, efficiency, and political sustainability.  At the level of policy
design, three approaches are suggested:
(i) The deterioration in system design and implementation of public SP programs is the
result of not only changing voter coalitions, but of personal interests by politicians and
bureaucrats  as  well.  One  method  of  protecting  the  original  design  consists  of  an
appropriate self-binding mechanism, enhanced transparency, and stricter accountability.
Relatively  successful  examples  of  such  an  approach  include  the  long-term  fiscal
projections under the US pension  system, present value budgeting in New Zealand, and
periodic  evaluations  of  all  existing  programs  and  of  proposed  changes  in  many
industrialized countries.  While these recent changes often help, more needs to be done
with respect to our client countries.
(ii) Once political sustainability becomes a criterion for program design, the resiliency
toward  political  risk  becomes  an  important  element  for  program  selection.  The
conjectured trade-off  between  equity,  efficiency,  and  sustainability  suggests that  an
explicit second best solution from an efficiency or equity point of view may be selected if
they are considered more resilient to political risk.  Examples include individual savings
accounts to cope with income risk due to unemployment or health compared to unfunded
and publicly managed provisions.
22(ii) Reforming public programs of risk management such as pensions, unemployment or
sickness benefits proves very difficult politically. Entrenched interests, acquired rights or
a lack of credibility of the proposed alternatives are among the most common obstacles.
While resistance to reform is not  specific to SP programs, the problem is particularly
prevalent and difficult to overcome.  This suggests that, in order to be able to introduce
new and better instruments of SRM, a better understanding of the political economy of
reform is required.
V. How  does this affect  our View of Social  Protection?
Applying the social risk management concept may change our view of social protection
and the instruments needing improvement or invention.  The change will evolve during
the work on the SPSSP, and the development of country-specific, regional, and a global
sector strategies.  For this reason, no conclusions are here attempted.  The following is a
tentative list for which comments and suggestions are welcome:
*  SRM  provides  an  integrated  view  on  informal,  market-based  and  public  risk
management arrangements and:
*  Stresses the  importance of  all  arrangements, and the  shift  in  importance and
structure with economic development;
*  Allows  a common assessment  of these arrangements against the benchmark -
reduction in vulnerability, improvement in consumption smoothing, enhancement
in equity, and contribution to sustainable economic development;
*  Emphasizes that all types of arrangements - while attempting to contribute to risk
management  - can be detrimental to economic  development.
*  Moving  from  the  static poverty  to  dynamic and risk-based  vulnerability concept
broadens  the  scope  of  traditional  poverty  reduction  policies  from  reactive  and
transfer-type to pro-active measures.
*  Heightens the  importance of policy  measure to strengthen informal arrangements,
such as:
*  Family as pro-active, risk mitigating, and risk coping institution;
*  Communities and importance of social capital;
*  The role of NGOs in providing risk-mitigating and targeted risk-coping support.
*  Fosters the importance of new and innovative formal arrangements, such as:
*  Multi-pillar pension systems;
*  Individual  social  accounts  to  handle  multiple risks  (unemployment, sickness
disability, survivorship, old-age);
*  New delivery systems of health care.
*  Offers legitimacy to many intervention as risk management mechanism, such as:
*  Micro-credit institutions;
*  Targeted credit arrangements to poor, women, and remote areas;
23*  Social Investment Funds with pro-active (e.g., income generation and education),
risk mitigating (e.g., water supply) and risk coping features (e.g., public works).
*  Puts the role of the government in perspective:
*  Governments have  in  important  role  for  the  establishing  and  functioning  of
informal and market-based arrangements;
*  Governments and public administration  also have their  own agenda, exposing
such arrangements to political risk.
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